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ABSTRACT 
There has been a remarkable growth in evolutionary economics since the 1980s. But despite 
this outward success there has been inner disagreement on fundamental issues including the 
building blocks of evolutionary theory and the very meaning of ‘evolution’ itself. This essay 
provides a philosophical perspective on both the defining agreements and ongoing disputes 
within evolutionary economics. Its primary emphasis is on ontology. It shows that some 
major disputes derive not from incompatible propositions but the choice of different levels of 
analysis. A route toward reconciliation of different viewpoints is thus exposed. 
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A Philosophical Perspective on Contemporary 
Evolutionary Economics 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson 
Although there are many precursors, the modern wave of evolutionary economics began in 
the 1980s, particularly after the publication of Richard Nelson’s and Sidney Winter’s (1982) 
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change.1 In the following years much of the work in this 
genre was applied and policy-oriented. Theoretical developments have been significant, but 
there has not yet been convergence on an integrated approach (Silva and Teixeira 2009). It is 
partly for the reason that there has been an intensifying debate since the 1990s on 
evolutionary principles and the underlying ontological assumptions of evolutionary 
economics.  
The aim of this article is to examine the philosophical communalities and divergences that 
have been revealed in the literature. Seven sections follow. The first sketches the historical 
background. It notes that despite the looseness and imprecision of the term ‘evolution’, there 
is an identifiable international network or ‘college’ of ‘evolutionary economists’ whose work 
can be placed under philosophical scrutiny. The second section considers the philosophical 
differences in broad terms and directs attention to ontology as the basis of much relevant 
agreement and dispute. The third section considers a number of ontological communalities in 
evolutionary economics. It is followed by two sections on ontological divergences. Of these, 
the fifth section outlines the ontology of complex population systems. This lays the ground 
for the discussion of generalised Darwinism in the sixth section. The final section shows that 
some of the key disputes within evolutionary economics derive not from incompatible 
propositions but from different levels of abstraction within a single ontological framework. A 
strategy for the reconciliation of apparent differences is thus revealed. 
1. History and Meanings 
Any consideration of the philosophical aspects of evolutionary economics immediately faces 
the problem that the term has been used historically in a wide variety of ways. The first use of 
the term ‘evolutionary economics’ in English was probably by Thorstein Veblen (1898, p. 
398). Although Veblen was one of the founders of the original institutional economics, his 
followers abandoned his Darwinian legacy (Hodgson 2004). While they retained the word 
‘evolutionary’, it was used to refer more broadly to development and change, as with the 
Association for Evolutionary Economics in the USA. 
                                                 
1 The author is very grateful to John Davis, Wade Hands, Dick Nelson and Ulrich Witt for especially helpful 
comments on preceding versions of this essay.  
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Joseph Schumpeter famously described capitalist development as an evolutionary process. 
Work influenced by Schumpeter is also described as ‘evolutionary economics’ as evidenced 
by the title of the Journal of Evolutionary Economics, published by the International Joseph 
Schumpeter Society. Much work in the tradition of Nelson and Winter, particularly 
concerning industrial dynamics, is identified within this genre.  
The Austrian School of economists is often described as ‘evolutionary’, as portrayed in 
Carl Menger’s theory of the evolution of money and other institutions, and by the extensive 
use of evolutionary ideas in the later works of Friedrich Hayek. 
In addition, the economics of assorted writers such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Alfred 
Marshall and others are sometimes described as ‘evolutionary’ in character. Finally, 
evolutionary game theory is a prominent recent development in mainstream economics. 
There is no good reason to claim than any one approach has greater claim to the 
‘evolutionary’ mantle than another. Consideration of philosophical underpinnings is thus 
greatly complicated by this diversity of analysis and lack of consensus over meaning.  
In particular, there is nothing in the etymology or usage of the term ‘evolution’ that 
necessarily connotes Darwinism. The word was used long before Charles Darwin; it was first 
applied to natural phenomena by the German biologist Albrecht von Haller in 1744. Darwin 
himself used the word sparingly.  
‘Evolution’ is a term of wide meaning, often connoting little more than development or 
change. This is especially the case in modern French and some other languages, where 
‘evolution’ or its equivalent is used frequently in everyday parlance to refer to any process of 
development, often referring to single entities. In English its usage is less common, and it 
sometimes refers more restrictively to natural selection, but there is no warrant to insist on 
that narrower meaning. 
In the social sciences as a whole, the term ‘evolution’ fell out of favour between the two 
world wars. The term did not become more widespread until after the publication of Kenneth 
Boulding’s (1981) Evolutionary Economics, Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter´s (1982) An 
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change and Friedrich Hayek’s (1988) Fatal Conceit 
(which developed evolutionary ideas from some of Hayek’s earlier works from the 1960s and 
1970s).  
This shift in usage is clear from the bibliometric evidence. The number of articles or books 
in economics (in English) with the word ‘evolution’ (or derivatives) in their title or subtitle 
leapt from none in the 1940s and fifteen in the 1970s to 75 in the 1980s (Hodgson 2004, p. 
416). From 1990 the count has increased well into the hundreds (Silva and Teixeira 2009).  
Although the books by Boulding, Hayek, and Nelson and Winter all incorporated 
Darwinian ideas, their use was qualified, reluctant or even inexplicit (Hodgson 1993, 1999). 
Being the most influential of the three, Nelson and Winter’s (1982) volume mentioned 
Darwin only once in passing, ignored Veblen, and claimed a pre-eminently ‘Schumpeterian’ 
influence for its approach. Yet their theory embodied Darwinian processes of variety-creation, 
information inheritance, and selection. They even drew an analogy between routines and 
genes. But ironically Joseph Schumpeter eschewed the use of Darwinian ideas in economics 
and all biological analogies (Hodgson 1993, Witt 2002. Andersen 2009).  
Although the word evolution became popular, and Darwinian ideas were stalking in the 
shadows, many economists remained reluctant to go so far as Veblen and tackle economic 
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evolution with the core principles of Darwinism. Nazism, racism, eugenics and other horrors 
of the twentieth century had repelled many social scientists from any use of ideas from 
biology (Degler 1991). This resistance is still apparent today.  
Despite this, by the 1990s it was possible to write of an international network or ‘invisible 
college’ of ‘evolutionary economists’ who, despite their differences of approach, were 
focusing on the problem of analysing structural, technological, cultural and institutional 
change in economic systems (Verspagen and Werker 2003, Witt 2008, Silva and Teixeira 
2009). Reference within this informal college is typically made to a variety of alleged 
precursors such as Schumpeter, Hayek, Marshall and Veblen, but the evolutionary college is 
too amorphous and eclectic to warrant a description in terms of a single mentor or school. 
Notably, although this college has many outposts in Asia, Australasia and the Western 
Hemisphere, it is particularly strong in Europe.  
Despite its internal heterogeneity and lack of consensus on key issues, the networks, 
journals and forums that developed after the late 1980s created a scattered but linked 
community of scholars addressing common problems and overlapping research agendas. They 
were also united by their common dislike of the static and equilibrium approaches that 
dominated mainstream economics. 
Despite the lack of a commonly agreed theoretical framework, evolutionary economists 
began to make considerable headway in the application of their ideas to empirical and policy 
matters. Evolutionary economics quickly established an impressive research programme and 
had a major impact on economic policy, particularly in the areas of technology policy, 
corporate strategy and national systems of innovation (Dosi et al., 1988). 
Consequently it is possible to identify a loose community of ‘evolutionary economists’ and 
proceed to examine the philosophical issues that underlie both their achievements and their 
disputes. This task is further facilitated by a growing discourse within ‘evolutionary 
economics’ on philosophical questions.  
2. Philosophical differences broadly considered 
Scientific reasoning occurs on different levels, and disputes can occur on one or more of 
these. There is the ontological level concerning assumptions about the nature of reality, the 
epistemological level concerning how knowledge is gained and justified, the heuristic level 
concerning how problems are framed, and the methodological level concerning theoretical 
explanations and their construction. I indicate below that ontology is the most important for 
understanding differences of approach within evolutionary economics. 
But there are important epistemological and methodological divergences as well. The 
ancient epistemological dispute between rationalism (deduction) and empiricism (induction) 
is reflected within evolutionary genres in the contrast between the axiomatic approach of 
evolutionary game theory and, on the other hand, the more empirically-oriented research.   
Intermediate epistemological positions are possible. Darwin himself saw theory as a 
necessary prerequisite of empirical investigation: ‘without the making of theories I am 
convinced there would be no observation’ (F. Darwin, 1887, vol. 2, p. 315). Alfred Marshall 
(1920, p. 29) quoted and endorsed Gustav Schmoller’s statement that: ‘Induction and 
deduction are both needed for scientific thought as the left foot and the right foot are both 
needed for walking.’ Similarly, the approach adopted by Richard Nelson and others combines 
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elements of grand theory with extensive empirical investigation (Nelson and Winter 1982, 
Malerba et al. 1999). Alongside the theoretical features of his earlier work, Nelson (2006, p. 
491) has gone so far as to express qualified support for generalising Darwinian principles to 
cover social evolution.  
Nevertheless, this epistemological divide between induction and deduction, and attempts to 
establish intermediate positions, are familiar throughout the history of economics and further 
exploration in general terms would add little that is new.  
A major methodological difference concerns whether social phenomena can eventually be 
explained largely in biological terms (e.g. Hirshleifer 1977), or biological influences or 
constraints are too important to be ignored alongside additional cultural influences (Veblen 
1899, Boyd and Richerson 1985, Camerer et al. 2005), or biological influences are so 
unimportant that they generally can be ignored in considering human potential (Rose et al. 
1984). Underling this issue are important ontological assumptions about causal relations 
(Hodgson 2007a), particularly concerning the causal links between human biology and 
individual preferences and beliefs. It is possible that some denials of biological influences on 
preferences or beliefs are grounded on an ontological dualism, where the realms of human 
society and thought are somehow causally disconnected from biology and nature.  
Once again, ontological issues lie beneath the surface. This has led to a growing literature 
on the ontology of evolutionary economics (Foss 1994, Herrmann-Pillath 2001, Hodgson 
2002, Dopfer and Potts 2004, Vromen 2004, Hodgson and Knudsen 2006, Witt 2008). For 
these and other reasons the primary focus of this essay is on ontology. We turn to this in the 
following sections. 
3. Primary ontological communalities with some secondary divergences 
What is the nature of the world to which the principles of evolutionary economics apply? 
Among contemporary evolutionary economists there is universal agreement on four important 
features. But as we shall see below, basic agreement on the fourth feature within the 
evolutionary college is combined with some important additional differences of stress or 
interpretation, in addition to further differences explored in the next section.  
First, and above all, it is a world of change. But this change is not merely quantitative or 
parametric: it involves qualitative changes in technology, organisations and the structure of 
the economy (Schumpeter 1934). The equilibrium orientation of much mainstream economics 
is criticised precisely for its limited ability to embrace such qualitative change (Klaes 2004). 
Second, an important feature of economic change is the generation of novelty. Variety and 
its replenishment through novelty and creativity is a central theme of contemporary 
evolutionary economics. Nicolai Foss (1994, p. 21) argues that evolutionary economics of the 
type developed by Giovanni Dosi, Richard Nelson, Sidney Winter, Ulrich Witt and others is 
concerned with ‘the transformation of already existing structures and the emergence and 
possible spread of novelties.’ Accordingly, Witt (1992, p. 3) writes: ‘for a proper notion of 
socioeconomic evolution, an appreciation of the crucial role of novelty, its emergence, and its 
dissemination, is indispensable.’ And Witt (2009) addresses novelty in more depth.  
Novelty drives technological and institutional evolution. But by its nature it is 
unpredictable (Popper 1960) and implies a unidirectional arrow of time. Consequently 
modern evolutionary economists are generally cautious about the possibilities for prediction 
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and regard the predictions of mainstream economists as typically grounded on a neglect of 
novelty, uncertainty, and surprise.  
Third, evolutionary economists stress the complexity of economic systems. There are 
various definitions of ontological complexity, but many invoke the key idea of causal 
interaction between a number of entities with varied characteristics (Saviotti 1996). Such 
complex ontologies involve non-linear and chaotic interactions, further limiting predictability. 
They create the possibility of emergent properties and further novelties. And generally the 
combination of novelty and complexity make many evolutionary changes irreversible (Dosi 
and Metcalfe 1991).  
Fourth, just as Darwin showed that intricate and complex phenomena can emerge without 
God or design, evolutionary economists adopt the insight of Friedrich Hayek and others that 
many human institutions and other social arrangements evolve spontaneously through 
individual interactions, without an overall planner or blueprint.  
But universal acceptance of the importance of self-organisation or undesigned order does 
not mean unanimity on its ontological details or its explanatory significance. One crucial 
problem is whether markets or exchange are the universal ether of human interaction (from 
which spontaneous order emerges) or whether markets and contracts depend significantly on 
other institutions (such as the state) and whose evolution has to be explained, which may in 
fact involve a significant measure of planning or design, as well as spontaneity (Vanberg 
1986, Hodgson 1993, 2009). Differences of view over the latter issue lead to a variety of 
policy positions over the roles of states or markets in the evolutionary college, which I do not 
begin to explore here.  
There is also a divergence over whether the idea of self-organisation is sufficient to explain 
social evolution (Foster 1997, p. 444), or is an ‘abstract, general description of evolutionary 
processes’ (Witt 1997, p. 489), or has to be supplemented by other major mechanisms such as 
selection (Kauffman 1993, Hodgson and Knudsen 2006, in press, Aldrich et al. 2008, 
Geisendorf 2009).  
4. First primary ontological divergence: dualism versus monism 
There are two major areas of (overt or covert) ontological dispute within the evolutionary 
college. The first concerns monism versus dualism. The second concerns the demarcation of 
entities within the evolving system, and the impact of that demarcation on theory 
construction. These two divergences are addressed sequentially in this and the following 
section.  
The ontological dispute between monism and dualism is central to philosophy and has 
major (but often unacknowledged) implications for the social sciences. Ontological dualism 
asserts that mind (or spirit) and matter are disconnected and fundamentally distinct kinds of 
substances. By contrast, monists uphold that ultimate reality is entirely of one kind of 
substance, and accordingly there is potential causal interaction between any one segment of 
reality and another.  
Most modern monists describe the stuff of reality as matter. By contrast there is an 
alternative idealist-monist tradition that sees ideas as the essential stuff of the universe, as 
recently posited by evolutionary economists Kurt Dopfer and Jason Potts (2008, p. 3).  
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Emergentist materialism is a relatively nuanced version, and does not deny the reality of 
mind. It upholds that material reality is structured in different levels, resulting from 
complexities of interaction and emergent properties (e.g. Bunge 1977, 1979). Mario Bunge 
(1980) classifies Darwin as an emergentist materialist. Darwin saw the human mind and 
intentionality as themselves caused – rather than insignificant, as some misinterpreters 
suggest – and hence potentially subject to causal explanation (Dennett 1995, Hodgson 2004). 
Partly for the reason, Darwinism had an early impact on philosophy, psychology and the 
social sciences (James 1890, Veblen 1898, Dewey 1910).  
By contrast, some economists deny that intentions and beliefs are caused on the grounds 
that to assume otherwise would undermine the reality of human agency or spontaneity. 
Hence, George Shackle (1986, pp. 281-2) posits the “uncaused cause” and Lanse Minkler 
(2008, p. 21) argues for an individual “free of external causes.” Jack Vromen (2001) ably 
counters such arguments: the fact that intentions are somehow caused or determined does not 
mean that human agency is any less substantial or real. If our intentions are caused it does not 
mean that we are released from responsibility for our actions. And even if they were uncaused 
it would not mean that individual responsibility was real (Dewey 1894, Hodgson 2004, pp. 
61-2).  
Sometimes reflecting an implicit dualism, much of social science takes preferences, reasons 
or beliefs as given. This ‘folk psychology’ obscures a much more complex 
neurophysiological reality. It cannot adequately explain the origins of preferences, reasons 
and beliefs. Commonplace ‘mind-first’ explanations of human behaviour are unable to 
explain adequately such phenomena as sleep, memory, learning, mental illness, or the effects 
of chemicals or drugs on our perceptions or actions (Bunge 1980, Damasio 1994, Rosenberg 
1995, Kilpinen 1999).  
Witt (2008) emphasises the importance of the divergence between monism and dualism for 
evolutionary economics. He points out that much theorising in the Schumpeterian and 
Nelson-Winter traditions fails to examine possible biological influences on economic 
phenomena, such as the impact of the human genetic endowment on human capabilities and 
behaviour. But to be fair, this neglect does not necessarily stem from ontological dualism. It 
could flow from a monist ontology combined with a view that human nature is highly 
malleable, and that genetic constraints are of lesser explanatory importance. Whether the 
latter view is valid is different matter. Its veracity or falsehood cannot be determined without 
empirical enquiry.  
Witt stresses not only ontological monism but also the significance of understanding the 
causal and constraining roles of the human genetic endowment in social science. On this basis 
Witt (2004, pp. 131-2) establishes the ‘continuity hypothesis’ according to which natural 
evolution has ‘shaped the ground, and still defines the constraints, for man-made, or cultural, 
evolution … economic evolution can be conceived as emerging from, and being embedded in, 
the constraints shaped by evolution in nature.’ But this important idea pre-dates Darwin and 
modern evolutionary theory. For example, Auguste Comte (1853, vol. 2, p. 112) wrote: 
‘Biology will be seen to afford the starting point of all social speculation in accordance with 
the analysis of the social faculties of Man and the organic conditions which determine its 
character.’ Today the idea that the natural world shapes and conditions the social has become 
commonplace, even among social scientists. The problem is that social scientists disagree on 
the nature, impact and relevance of the genetic constraints. 
7
 #1001 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The continuity hypothesis directs our attention at possible biological determinants of 
human behaviour. But contrary to one of its supporters (Cordes 2006), there is nothing in this 
hypotheses that overturns the different idea that Darwinian principles can be generalised to 
embrace social evolution (as outlined later below). For Witt this enquiry does not overturn 
generalised Darwinism, but neither does it require it.  
5. Second primary ontological divergence: a population ontology 
A second ontological divergence is less prominent in the history of philosophy, although it 
was discussed by Alfred N. Whitehead (1929). I suggest the term ‘plurality principle’ to refer 
to an ontological plurality of demarcated entities. This is not the same as ontological 
pluralism, which refers to multiple, disconnected kinds of being, and of which ontological 
dualism is one example. Instead it ‘conveys the notion of disjunctive diversity ... There are 
many “beings” in disjunctive diversity’ (Whitehead 1929, p. 31). The plurality principle is 
consistent with monism because the plurality of entities could be made of the same substance. 
It upholds that reality consists of many demarcated entities, and every entity is different (at 
least in terms of its timing or position) from every other entity.  
Whitehead influenced systems theory, where notions of system and subsystem are 
ubiquitous (Miller 1978). In turn there may be sub-sub-systems, and so on. Entities within 
populations may themselves contain populations, leading to a more complex ontology. In any 
case the problem here is to define and account for the boundaries and integrity of each entity 
or subsystem in the plurality. This task is very tricky, and there is no consensus on a clear 
definitional formula. The plurality principle relies on the existence of sufficient integrity and 
coherence within multiple entities, including sufficient interdependence of each entity and its 
components, to establish boundaries between multiple entities and establish a plurality of 
(sub)systems.  
A population ontology is a special plurality of demarcated entities. There are many 
individually different and demarcated entities, grouped in populations according to some 
shared characteristics. Obvious examples would be industries containing firms, and hence 
such a population ontology will be recognised by most evolutionary economists. Divergences 
in the college occur partly because of different degrees of ontological salience given to the 
plurality principle and the role it plays in the development of theory.  
Consider, for example, the question of endogenous versus exogenous change. In his studies 
of economic evolution, Schumpeter (1934, p. 63) repeatedly emphasised the sources of 
change ‘from within’. Other evolutionary economists, including Witt (1992) and Esben Sloth 
Andersen (1994), have followed this definitional emphasis on a self-transforming economic 
system. For this claim of endogenous change to be meaningful there must be some notion of a 
bounded system that does not itself exhaust the universe. If there is nothing without that 
system, then the claim that change is driven from within is trivial. So where do the boundaries 
lie? One passage is illuminating. Witt (2008, p. 551) writes: 
Consider something that evolves, be it the gene pool of a species, a language spoken in a 
human community, the technology and institutions of an economy, or the set of ideas 
produced by the human mind. Although such entities can change over time in response to 
exogenous ... forces ... their genuinely evolutionary feature is that they are capable of 
transforming themselves endogenously over time. ... In the biological domain, for 
instance, the crucial processes are genetic recombination and mutation. 
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Notice first that the first sentence refers to ‘something that evolves’ (despite several items on 
the list clearly having multiple members). This establishes the foremost boundary around the 
whole ‘something’ or the ‘set’, and downplays any additional boundaries around individual 
members of any set. In other words, the population characteristics of any set are given less 
emphasis. Second, there is no explanation given why self-transformation (of one entity) is 
more ‘genuine’ than other forms of evolution (such as those that involve multiple entities). 
Third, population characteristics are overlooked even when Witt turns to biology for 
illustration. Accordingly, the last quoted sentence concerning ‘the biological domain’ 
sympotomatically omits any mention of natural selection.2 
Importantly, selection is meaningful only within an ontology of populations of multiple 
entities. Consequently ‘population thinking’ becomes necessary (Mayr 1976, 1982). A 
corollary of the plurality principle is that their evolution can involve not only the immanent 
transformation of individual entities, but also changes resulting from interactions with other 
entities, as well as with their environment. Once we have an ontology involving such 
populations, then questions arise not only concerning the development of each individual 
entity, but also how each entity interacts with others, and why some entities survive longer 
and are more successful in some sense than others.  
This ontological consideration is relevant for another group of researchers, which overlap 
to some degree with the evolutionary college. Much of ‘complexity theory’ addresses not 
complex phenomena in general, but a particular form of complexity typically described by 
John Holland (1992), Brian Goodwin (1994), Stuart Kauffman (1995), Ralph Stacey (1996, 
2003), Brian Arthur et al. (1997) and many others as a ‘complex adaptive system’. Although 
many accounts address singular systems, often these are made up of multiple interconnected 
entities. In complex adaptive systems theory a number of agents interact with each other and 
together form a system that adapts to its environment. Consideration of whether a particular 
object of analysis involves a population ontology is relevant for this literature as well.  
6. From complex population systems to generalised Darwinism 
Population ontologies involving further important characteristics are described as ‘complex 
population systems’ (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006, in press, Aldrich et al. 2008). By 
definition, complex population systems contain multiple varied (intentional or non-
intentional) entities that interact with the environment and each other. They face immediately 
scarce resources and struggle to survive, whether through conflict or cooperation. They are 
mortal or degradable and thus engaged in a struggle for existence (Darwin 1859, pp. 62-63). 
They adapt and may pass on information to others, through replication or imitation. 
(Information here is defined very broadly, in the Shannon-Weaver sense of conditional 
dispositions or coding that can be transmitted to other entities and cause a response.) 
Examples of complex population systems are plentiful both in nature and in human society, 
despite their special definitional features. They include every biological species, from amoeba 
                                                 
2 In a written comment on a previous version of this paper, Witt explained that he omitted selection here 
‘because it reduces variety rather than creating it.’ This may be true of subset selection but not generally of 
successor selection. Subset selection simply means the elimination of some members of a set. By contrast, in 
successor selection – which is important in both natural and social evolution – new entities are created alongside 
others that expire (Price 1995, Hodgson and Knudsen, in press, ch. 5).  
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to humans. And importantly for the social scientist, they include human organisations, as long 
as we regard organisations as cohesive entities having some capacity for the retention of 
information. An economic example is an industry involving cohesive organizational entities 
such as business firms.  
In this manner, the common ontological features of all complex population systems, 
including in nature and human society, are established, without ignoring the huge differences 
of detail between them. 
The evolution of any complex population system must involve the three Darwinian 
principles of variation, selection and retention (Campbell 1965). These abstract principles do 
not themselves provide all the necessary details, but nevertheless they must be honoured, for 
otherwise the explanation of evolution will be inadequate. In particular, investigations into 
complex population systems must address (a) the sources and replenishment of variety in the 
population, (b) how information is passed from one entity in the population to another, and (c) 
why some entities are more successful in surviving or passing on information than others. 
These three explanatory requirements map onto the three core Darwinian principles of 
variation, replication and selection. To make this move, these Darwinian principles have to be 
defined in sufficiently abstract and general terms, so that they are no longer confined to the 
biological domain (Hull 1988, Hull et al. 2001, Hodgson and Knudsen, in press). 
Consider these explanatory requirements in more detail. First, there must be some 
explanation of how variety is generated and replenished in a population. In biological systems 
the answers – established since Darwin’s death – involve genetic recombination and 
mutations. By contrast, the evolution of social institutions involves innovation, planning and 
other mechanisms very different from the detailed processes found in biology (Crozier 2008).  
Second, there must be an explanation for how useful information concerning solutions to 
particular adaptive problems is retained and passed on. This requirement follows directly 
from our assumptions concerning the broad nature of complex population systems, wherein 
there must be some mechanism by which adaptive solutions are copied and passed on. In 
biology, these mechanisms often involve genes and DNA. In social evolution, we may include 
the very different replication or imitation of habits, customs, rules and routines, all of which 
may carry solutions to adaptive problems.  
Third, and not least, there must be an explanation of the fact that entities differ in their 
longevity and fecundity. In given contexts, some entities are more adapted than others, some 
survive longer than others, and some are more successful in producing offspring or copies of 
themselves. This is the principle of selection. In its abstract definition, selection involves an 
anterior set of entities, each interacting with its environment and somehow being transformed 
into a posterior set where all members of the posterior set are sufficiently similar to some 
members of the anterior set, and where the resulting frequencies of posterior entities depend 
upon their properties in the environmental context (Price 1995). Through selection, a set of 
entities, a population, will gradually adapt in response to the criteria defined by an 
environmental factor. Even when both variety-creation and selection involve human agency, 
as often is the case in the human domain, the two processes are quite distinct. Innovation is 
about the creation of new variations, whereas selection is about how they are tested in the real 
world. It is important to emphasise that although fitness characteristics play a role in 
selection, in neither the biological nor the social world is the outcome necessarily optimal, 
efficient or desirable (Dupré 1987, Hodgson 1993, Gould 2002).  
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What is suggested here is that core abstract Darwinian principles themselves have a wider 
application than to biology alone. Darwin (1859, 1871) himself proposed that they might 
apply to the evolution of language and morality, as well as to biological organisms. 
Consideration of such a generalised Darwinism has a long history, including Veblen (1899), 
Donald T. Campbell (1965) and Richard Dawkins (1983).  
But because the ontological presumptions of a complex population system are not 
universal, Dawkin’s use of the term ‘universal Darwinism’ is misleading. That is why several 
authors prefer the term ‘generalised’ Darwinism (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006, in press, 
Aldrich et al. 2008, Stoelhorst 2008). 
Second, it is important to emphasise that while Darwinian principles are employed, 
generalised Darwinism does not mean that social evolution is explained largely or wholly in 
biological terms. Indeed, the principles would apply to social evolution even if there were no 
significant genetic change. Darwinian principles are instead applied to socio-economic units, 
including organisations and their component customs or routines.  
Third, generalised Darwinism is not a matter of biological analogies. It rests instead on 
purported ontological communality. Analogies take phenomena and processes in one domain 
as reference points for the study of similar phenomena or processes in another domain. 
Differences are regarded as dis-analogies. Social evolution is clearly dis-analogous to genetic 
evolution, because of the very different entities and mechanisms of replication (Crozier 
2008).  
By contrast, generalisation in science starts from a deliberately copious array of different 
phenomena and processes, without giving analytical priority to any of them. Where possible, 
scientists adduce shared principles. Given that the entities and processes involved are very 
different, these common principles will be fairly abstract and will not reflect detailed 
mechanisms unique to any particular domain. The very triumph of successful generalization is 
in the face of real and acknowledged differences at the level of detail (Kitcher 1981). 
7. Conclusion: a strategy of reconciliation 
From this perspective, a central feature of Witt’s (2008) argument requires further thought. 
Witt (2008, pp. 551-5) distinguishes between two ‘heuristic strategies’, namely a ‘generic 
concept of evolution’ involving the ‘twin concept’ of ‘novelty emergence and dissemination’ 
and ‘generalized Darwinian concepts’. He combines these two heuristics with the ontological 
split between monism and dualism to form a two-by-two matrix of types of evolutionary 
economics.  
A problem with this configuration is that, contrary to Witt, generalised Darwinism is not 
simply a heuristic strategy but also more importantly it rests on specific ontological 
presuppositions. When we examine these presuppositions it is clear that Witt’s ‘generic 
concept of evolution’ does not exclude generalised Darwinism. The latter also embraces the 
vital issue of ‘novelty emergence and dissemination’. Hence contrary to a possible 
interpretation of Witt’s two-by-two matrix there is no dichotomy between Witt’s ‘generic 
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concept of evolution’ and the ontology of generalised Darwinism: the latter is a special case 
of the former.3 
Cordes (2006) and Witt (2008, p. 559) warn of the dangers in adopting generalised 
Darwinism because it is ‘domain specific’. But its principles are not specific to biology alone: 
they are specific to all complex population systems, including human society.  
Obversely, one might warn of the dangers of confining ourselves to ontologies that are too 
domain general. Witt’s ‘generic concept of evolution’ involves an ontology of singular 
‘somethings’ that evolve. But for much analysis in the social domain it is important to get 
inside these ‘somethings’ and acknowledge their internal differention in terms of multiple 
entities. If multiple entities were fully acknowledged, then Witt’s ‘generic concept of 
evolution’ would cease to be generic in a fullest sense. In particular, the failure to 
acknowledge multiple entities means that the nature of the process of diffusion of novelty 
must be considered within the whole, not from demarcated entity to entity. Similarly, this 
‘generic concept of evolution’ cannot accommodate competition between different entities, 
without ceasing to be generic. 
It is not clear how much can be built upon this extremely general ontological specification 
without adding additional features. In practice, it would seem that any application of this 
‘generic concept of evolution’ to economic evolution must adopt a series of specific 
modifications that render the concept no longer generic. Furthermore, the more abstract of 
these modifications – such as the specification of an ontology of populations – are likely to 
move in the direction of complex population systems, as defined above. Witt’s ‘generic 
concept of evolution’ is not wrong but insufficient.  
Of course, there are many further important modifications that make the ontology even 
more specific than that of the complex population system. Important additional features that 
have to be brought into the picture at some stage are human intentionality, the capacity of 
humans for mental analysis and prefiguration, the nature of human sociality and cooperation, 
social institutions, and the development of different types and technologies of information 
transmission (Hodgson and Knudsen, in press). This means that the generalised Darwinian 
framework is also insufficient, but not that it is wrong (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006). To 
make any progress we have to move through several nested ontological specifications and 
levels of analysis (Hodgson 2001, pp. 329-30).  
Consequently it seems possible to reconcile conflicting positions in this recent and intense 
dispute. Witt (2008, p. 559) complains that generalised Darwinism relies on abstract 
principles that apply to evolutionary biology and are then ‘claimed to govern evolutionary 
processes in all spheres of reality.’ If this were true it would apply a fortiori to Witt’s ‘generic 
concept of evolution’ as well.  
The fact that both generalised Darwinism and Witt’s ‘generic concept of evolution’ apply 
to both biological and social evolution does not make them invalid. We are addressing 
abstract common principles that apply to both domains. This has been recognised by several 
leading evolutionary economists. As Sidney Winter (1987, p. 617) writes: 
                                                 
3 In a written comment on a previous version of this paper, Witt clarifies that while the choice between columns 
of his matrix (between monism and dualism) is dichotomous, the row choice between the two different 
‘heuristics’ is ‘not a dichotomy but a difference.’  
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In sum, natural selection and evolution should not be viewed as concepts developed for 
the specific purposes of biology and possibly appropriable for the specific purposes of 
economics, but rather as elements of the framework of a new conceptual structure that 
biology, economics and other social sciences can comfortably share. 
J. Stanley Metcalfe (1998, pp. 21-2) developed this point in more detail: 
That evolution is a core concept in biology does not mean that it is an inherently 
biological concept. Evolution can happen in other domains providing that conditions for 
an evolutionary process are in place. Thus, as economists applying evolutionary ideas to 
economic phenomena, we can learn from the debates on evolutionary biology in order to 
understand better the logical status of concepts such as fitness, adaptation and unit of 
selection without in any sense needing to absorb the associated biological context. 
Metcalfe (p. 36) continues: 
Nothing I have said is intrinsically a matter of biological analogy, it is a matter of 
evolutionary logic. Evolutionary theory is a manner of reasoning in its own right quite 
independently of the use made of it by biologists. They simply got there first … 
Both these authors hint at Darwinism without mentioning it by name. They also show 
explicitly that leading evolutionary economists start from general, abstract principles that 
apply to both biological and social evolution. The latter is also true of Witt (2008). This 
common ground suggests the possibility of reconciliation on some fundamental issues, while 
retaining a creativity diversity of detailed approaches.  
The first step in strategy of reconciliation proposed here is to acknowledge that Witt’s 
‘generic concept of evolution’ and generalised Darwinian principles both apply to social and 
economic evolution, by virtue of their overlapping ontological stress on novelty and change. 
The further ontological presuppositions of generalised Darwinism are a special case of Witt’s 
‘generic concept of evolution’. The second step is to understand that they are on different 
levels of abstraction. The third is to acknowledge that no single level of abstraction is 
adequate to approach the details and specificities involved. 
While both Witt’s ‘generic concept of evolution’ and generalized Darwinian principles 
apply, it is clear that the detailed mechanisms in society and nature are very different. 
Darwinism thus provides a metatheoretical framework, within which specific, detailed 
explanations must be placed. Darwinism, as such, cannot provide all the answers. Similar 
remarks apply to Witt’s ‘generic concept of evolution’. 
The challenge for both generalized Darwinism and Witt’s ‘generic concept of evolution’ is 
to show that they can have an important impact on the development of middle-range theory 
and serve as a useful guide for empirical enquiry. As Sandra Silva and Aurora Teixeira (2009) 
reveal, empirical work in evolutionary economics is relatively scarce, and there is a need to 
redirect the evolutionary research agenda. But theoretical frameworks are always necessary to 
guide empirical enquiry, and some consensus on theoretical fundamentals should empower 
this mission. A common recognition of the overlapping and nested ontologies discussed 
above, combined with a shared acknowledgment that vital matters of detail must always be 
added, provides a route towards reconciliation of apparently conflicting positions and a means 
of joining forces and framing shared problems in empirical analysis and middle-range theory 
construction.  
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Given these developments, the possibility emerges that evolutionary economics begins to 
generate a theoretical paradigm that to rival mainstream theory. This involves the shared 
evolutionary assumptions of a changing complex world that generates novelty. Agents therein 
have limited memories and cognitive capacities and assume that the rationality of others is 
similarly bounded (Hodgson 2007b). The work of Nelson and Winter (1982) has already 
generated extensive discussion of the role of routines in storing information within 
organisations (Becker 2008). More broadly, generalised Darwinian principles point to the 
need to examine different mechanisms of information retention and transmission between 
institutions, and the conditions of informational replication that have the potential to generate 
greater complexity (Hodgson and Knudsen, in press). Witt (2008, 2009) and others enhance 
this theoretical agenda of information transmission and complexity-generation, by pointing to 
the wellspring of novelty and examining the extent to which biological factors frame 
economic evolution. The overall promise here is for an economics that transcends static 
theory and accommodates a richer picture of the complexities and specificities of economic 
change.  
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